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Abstract
At present, pay for prescription models are insufficient at containing costs and improving access to med-
icines. Subscription financing through tenders, licensing fees and unrestricted or fixed volumes can benefit
stakeholders across the supply chain. Pharmaceutical manufacturers can reduce the need for marketing
expenses and gain certainty in revenue. This will decrease costs, improve predictability in budget expend-
iture for payers and remove price as a barrier of access from patients. Inherently, low- and middle-income
countries lack the purchasing power to leverage price discounts through typical price arrangements. These
markets can realise substantial savings for branded and generic medicines through subscription financing.
Procuring of on-patent and off-patent drugs requires separate analysis for competition effects, the length
of contract and encouraging innovation in the medicine pipeline. Prices of competitive on-patent medi-
cines and orphan drugs can be reduced through increased competition and volume. Furthermore, pooling
expertise and resources through joint procurement has the potential for greater savings. Incentivising
research and development within the pharmaceutical industry is essential for sustaining a competitive
market, preventing monopolies and improving access to expensive treatments. However, technical
capacity, forecasting demand and the quality of generic medicines present limitations which necessitate
government support and international partnerships. Ultimately, improving access requires progressive
financing mechanisms with patients and cost containment in mind.
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1. Introduction
Universal access to essential medicines remains a contentious global health challenge for infec-
tious and chronic diseases. At present, negotiating a successful compromise between patients,
payers and manufacturers has been inadequate, requiring a financing mechanism to balance com-
peting interests while prioritising equitable access and affordability (Atun et al., 2017).
Governments and private corporations leverage substantial influence in pharmaceutical markets
and policies. Proposed strategies, including compulsory licensing under the WTO-TRIPS flexibil-
ities and restricting patient eligibility to clinical subgroups has resulted in political and corporate
resistance, patient exclusion and aggressive pricing (Smith et al., 2009).
A subscription financing model for hepatitis C treatment, coined the ‘Netflix model’, has
implications for future financing (Trusheim et al., 2018; Moon and Erickson, 2019). An analysis
of limited data from Australia indicates a net benefit for stakeholders, consumers, payers and
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manufacturers (Izaret et al., 2019; Moon and Erickson, 2019). How transferable is it, particularly
to low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), and can it be used to finance other treatments?
2. The ‘Netflix model’
The global trend of subscription e-commerce has changed consumer behaviour by encouraging
demand without variable cost penalties. Subscription payment services require corporations to
provide an unlimited supply of goods and services, satisfying consumer demand for a prospect-
ively determined fixed price (Chen et al., 2018).
In 2015, Australia became the first country to implement a subscription model for pharma-
ceuticals. The federal government negotiated an unlimited supply of hepatitis C medicines for
a recurring licensing fee, providing universal access to treatment at no cost to patients (Moon
and Erickson, 2019). As the sole purchaser, the Australian government capitalised on monopsony
power in negotiations with manufacturers to obtain price discounts due to guaranteed funding
for a 5-year term and the competitive pricing behaviour of firms engaging in tender offers
(Fuller and Goldfield, 2016). A prospectively determined fixed cost (licensing fee) effectively
eliminates financial barriers as an impediment to accessing care for patients, encouraging com-
pliance with treatment. In January 2019, the US state of Louisiana agreed to a 5-year term with a
generic subsidiary of Gilead. Exclusion criteria under the agreement have limited patient eligibil-
ity for hepatitis C medicines to Medicaid enrolees and prison inmates (Trusheim et al., 2018;
Sagonowsky, 2019).
Under a subscription policy, consumers receive free medicines, are encouraged to comply
because of the fixed costs to payers and can expect high treatment rates (Izaret et al., 2019).
Payers are able to negotiate low costs through bulk purchasing while pharmaceutical manufac-
turers benefit from higher and predictable revenue, thereby eliminating the need for advertising,
distribution and marketing expenses, often twice the amount spent on R&D for new patented
medicines (Gagnon and Lexchin, 2008; Izaret et al., 2019).
3. Proposed expansion
Subscription financing reorganises purchasing and delivery from the micro to macro policy
agenda, targeting treatment initiatives at the population level (Trusheim et al., 2018).
Purchasing agreements using licensing and tendering have been proposed for chronic (e.g.
asthma and diabetes) and acute conditions (e.g. hepatitis C and tuberculosis) requiring recurring
treatment, which is especially important given the prevalence of these diseases in both high and
LMICs (Goldman et al., 2008). Medicines that could benefit from subscription agreements must
be part of a recurring treatment regimen and have a low marginal cost of production, and these
should be considered essential pre-conditions to achieve the required scale.
In the literature, advocacy for subscription financing extends to curative therapies and medical
conditions requiring recurring treatment (Goldman et al., 2008; Sood et al., 2018; Izaret et al.,
2019). Alternatively, diseases with regular and low treatment costs should be prioritised as suit-
able candidates for which subscription-based financing could prove more effective than current
pay-per-prescription models. Support for financing improvements in asthma and tuberculosis
medicines, and potential use in purchasing agreements for vaccinations, suggest a few potential
conditions (Goldman et al., 2008). Diabetes is a particularly strong candidate.
Diabetes accounts for a significant proportion of the global burden of disease. Paired with ris-
ing obesity rates, diabetes has significant implications for China, India and the USA, which by the
World Health Organization (WHO) estimates will have over 150 million diabetics by 2030
(‘WHO | Country and Regional Data on Diabetes’ 2011). Most diabetics can be treated with gen-
eric medicines (American Diabetes Association, 2007). In LMICs generics are frequently used to
reduce health care expenditure, these offer significant savings for patients and payers in contrast
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to branded alternatives (Razmaria, 2016). Producer’s utilise tiered or equity pricing using confi-
dential agreements and rebates to reduce prices in developing markets without affecting inter-
national prices. This results to a significant difference between the list price and confidential
transaction price, and avoids the practice of external reference pricing; the international bench-
mark of medicine prices to reduce paying higher costs than comparator countries. In a subscrip-
tion model prices are dependent on an estimated population and volume. A price-per-patient or
dose is not explicitly defined making this favourable to manufacturers participating in the global
pharmaceutical market (Moon and Erickson, 2019).
More commonly, firms engage in launch sequencing or no launches. This is a common strat-
egy to delay or restrict the release of medicines in markets they are unlikely to earn desired profits.
Consequently, in LMICs where originator medicines are available, prices are often substantially
higher than high income countries (Perez-Casas et al., 2001; Morel et al., 2011). This is due to
a lack of competition resulting in LMICs purchasing higher priced branded medicines. Price
competition for patented and generic medicines in LMICs has faced significant barriers.
Recent findings from the Centre for Global Development indicate that generic drugs can cost
between 20 and 30 times more in LMICs (Silverman et al., 2019). Future progress for price com-
petition in LMICs would require active purchasing mechanisms and well-developed insurance
systems. However, LMICs currently lack the infrastructure to achieve these and suffer from
fixed prices as a result. Therefore, patented and branded medicines are largely unavailable in low-
income settings and thus account for the predominant generic markets in these countries.
Most diabetics require regular insulin treatments and accumulate significant out-of-pocket
expenses over time. Generic medicines for diabetes offer an opportunity to treat patients at a
greatly reduced cost (American Diabetes Association, 2007). Thus, diabetes treatments satisfy
the essential criteria for subscription financing of life-long diagnosis and intensive medication
regimen. Purchasing a subscription for the entire population removes the financial barrier for
patient adherence, eliminating the need to prioritise cost over wellbeing. Further, user charges
including coinsurance, co-payments and deductibles can be reduced through a subscription
model. Health systems relying on additional revenue from user charges to finance medicines
can adjust the tender offer by lowering the bid price. Therefore, user charges can be minimised
and offset with lower bid prices to reduce access dependent payments.
Improving adherence contributes to societal welfare, alleviating the financial burden on the
health system without the balloon effect that results from adverse treatment compliance
(Goldman et al., 2008; Thomson et al., 2010). As the global prevalence of diabetes increases, a
protective measure that reduces out-of-pocket expenditure on health care can be used to finance
cooperative payment models for patients, payers and manufacturers.
4. On-patent and off-patent pharmaceutical markets
Negotiating a subscription financing agreement requires careful consideration for
anti-competitive supply-side behaviour. This poses implications for future competition, pricing
and access, and will depend on the type of medicines being procured, on-patent originator brands
or off-patent generics.
4.1 Off-patent markets
Within the off-patent pharmaceutical market generic medicines provide opportunities for cost
savings. Generics are bioequivalent to branded medicines, identical in quality and active ingredi-
ents at less than 85% of the cost (Razmaria, 2016). Globally generic medicines account for the
majority of pharmaceutical volume, and the predominant share of spending in LMICs. LMICs
including India, China and Brazil are projected to have the greatest global increase in volume
of medicines through 2020 benefiting from increased R&D and usage (Aitken and Kleinrock,
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2015). Generic competition is characterised by many suppliers producing at or below the mar-
ginal cost of production. Producers compete based on price through a competitive bidding
model to gain higher market share. Competition for generics in the off-patent market is different
from branded medicines in the on-patent market and requires different consideration for finan-
cing mechanisms.
Unlike on-patent medicines, tenders in the off-patent market benefit from significant compe-
tition with multiple generic producers. Tenders for generics in the out-patient pharmaceutical
markets in the Netherlands and Germany have achieved price reductions of greater than 90%
(Dranitsaris et al., 2017). Awarding a tender to a single producer with many competitors can
reduce the price discount achieved through competition. A split tender would prove more bene-
ficial for sustained competition and reduced prices in markets with high volumes of substitutable
generics. Segmenting the tender between a few producers; for example, three per therapeutic cat-
egory, avoids price collusion and oligopolistic behaviour. If producers fail to agree on a price, bids
from producers outside the therapeutic category can be requested to meet the projected demand.
Under generic competition purchasers can select to extend the tender for long-term agreements
but should remain aware of future innovations in treatment through health technology assess-
ment (HTA) horizon scanning.
4.2 On-patent markets
Originator, branded medicines profit from monopoly power and market exclusivity as a result of
patents and intellectual property rights conferred under the WTO-TRIPS agreement (Smith et al.,
2009). This enables firms to charge higher prices and recover expenses incurred through R&D.
Originator medicines are protected through the principal patent term of 20 years, in addition to
data exclusivity agreements and additional patent extensions which increase the duration (Smith
et al., 2009). In a tender model a single firm is selected to supply the entire market for the contract.
A market with a sole producer has minimal incentives to innovate, reduce prices or improve the
value added. In turn, this would reduce R&D from competing suppliers as they would be prevented
from market authorisation, leading to inefficiency in price and access. Therefore, a long-term sub-
scription for procuring patented medicines would result in anti-competitive behaviour, a benefit to
monopoly producers through elimination of future competition.
Avoiding supplier monopolies in a subscription model requires short-term agreements with
greater stability for purchasers. A contract length of 3–5 years provides stable revenue for suppliers,
budgetary predictability and forecasting for purchasers. Revenue and market share have shown to
decrease significantly following competition (Moon and Erickson, 2019). A short-term agreement
can encourage innovation and future entry from competitors, reducing the potential for a monop-
oly within the indication. The length of contracts can be further amended, inclusive of future innov-
ation within the pharmaceutical pipeline and integrated alongside horizon scanning performed by
HTA agencies. R&D within the pharmaceutical sector is conducive to a competitive market.
Horizon scanning through HTA agencies enables flexible contract lengths based on predicted
future developments. Forecasting medicine approval can promote competition among suppliers
and reduce the monopoly price paid by consumers. Purchasers can benefit from shorter agree-
ments to reflect the anticipated timeline of future medicines entering the market.
Sustainable long-term competition achieved through R&D requires short tender contracts which
encourage innovator market entry, and ultimately reduce the price for payers and consumers.
5. Netflix plus
The ‘Netflix model’ of subscription financing can reduce the price of first-in-class patented med-
icines and generics. If successful, incentivising competition and innovation through short-term
contracts will produce multiple on-patent therapeutic alternatives. This can further reduce the
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price for purchasers. In turn, this will lead to a competitive environment for branded and
patented medicines similar to off-patent markets, consisting of multiple producers within a thera-
peutic category. Split tenders and bulk contracting for on-patent medicines can facilitate compe-
tition among therapeutic alternatives and reduce the ability of suppliers to charge monopoly
prices. In effect, this would create an oligopoly market for patented medicines, with producers
competing to reduce prices and increase the value for consumers.
A further application of the model can be used for the treatment of rare diseases. Orphan
drugs are medicines for an extremely small patient population. The United States Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) defines an orphan disease as affecting less than 200,000 people, simi-
larly the European Medicines Agency (EMA) defines it as no more than 5 in 10,000 (European
Medicines Agency, 2013; US Food and Drug Administration, 2017). Orphan drugs are often
granted market exclusivity and able to benefit from high prices. Negotiations and price reductions
are limited with few eligible patients.
The Netflix subscription model would likely limit participation from orphan drug manufac-
turers. Orphan drugs are often the sole treatment option. A fee-for-service design using a price-
volume agreement, price reductions for successive purchases alongside tiered pricing in LMICs
can increase affordability in select markets. For greater benefit, joint purchasing between coun-
tries through regional agreements can increase access at lower costs. Price discounts would be
achieved through higher volumes, with additional savings including clawbacks, rebates and dis-
counts as the volume increases. This requires coordination between regulators, manufacturers and
payers of participating countries to determine an equitable compromise.
6. Netflix vs Netflix plus
Under the current Netflix agreement used by multiple states in the USA and the Australian gov-
ernment, a single medicine and manufacturer is awarded the tender for the specified contract
length. As previously mentioned, this presents a challenge by eliminating future competition
from market entrants. Conversely, the proposed Netflix plus model would incentivise R&D
and competition through a series of multiple tenders with patented therapeutic alternatives, cre-
ating an environment for patented medicines similar to the off-patent generic market. Previously,
the winner of the tender would be rewarded while other manufacturers would be unable to mar-
ket their product and raise revenue. In the Netflix plus amendment multiple short-term tenders
will incentivise future market entrants while negotiating reduced prices, bypassing the typical
exclusivity length. This is especially relevant for orphan diseases for niche indications which
are often dominated by single manufacturers. In this context, when a product is launched a guar-
anteed source of revenue (similar to a pull-mechanism for financing) will incentivise future devel-
opment. This would replicate the current effects of the off-patent medicine market for patented
medicines.
Rare diseases and orphan drugs are akin to monopolistic pricing with markets limited to few
or no competitors. Based off the strategy from the Netflix model a new treatment for a rare
disease would limit the award of a tender to a single manufacturer, dis-incentivising innovation
and competition. The proposed Netflix plus model would utilise a fee-for-service payment
combined with a price-volume agreement, larger supplies of purchased medicines would pro-
portionally reduce the cost of procurement for the payer. Purchasing agreements for orphan
drugs through the Netflix plus model would encourage joint procurement from multiple coun-
tries or regional trade partnerships due to the relatively small burden of disease for each coun-
try. This would also include caveats for equity pricing which lower the cost of medicines in
LMICs. Using rebates and discounts to achieve reductions in orphan drug prices would require
participation from public and private stakeholders but has the potential to encourage innov-
ation while stimulating competition, through guaranteed purchasing agreements and reduced
medicine prices.
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7. Joint procurement of medicines
Tenders and pricing agreements for medicines have proven difficult to negotiate in LMICs. Payers
face constraints in implementation with a lack of infrastructure, information technology, admin-
istration, data and expertise (WHO, 2007). Purchasers have minimal leverage to negotiate price
reductions (Espin et al., 2016). Overcoming barriers requires political investment to support
international collaboratives, regional blocs and joint procurement agreements to leverage price
subsidies. High-income countries benefit in negotiations from economies of scale with large
populations (WHO, 2007). In contrast, many LMICs have significantly sized populations but
have been unable to achieve similar discounts to high income countries. Small and low-income
countries have the most to benefit from joint procurement. These can be used to minimise the
adverse effect of intellectual property rights on LMICs (Espin et al., 2016).
Joint procurement of pharmaceuticals has demonstrated effectiveness for advance purchasing
and cross-border threats, specifically in Europe and South America (Azzopardi-Muscat et al.,
2017). Regional collaboratives in both high- and low-income countries have achieved promising
results; incentivising pharmaceutical competition and decreasing prices. Participating countries
pay the same price regardless of population, market size or development (Azzopardi-Muscat
et al., 2017). In turn, this may reduce the ability of firms to leverage differential prices across mar-
kets, through equity or Ramsey pricing.
Opportunities for purchasers to increase value and savings with subscription financing are sig-
nificant (Table 1). Two notable examples include the Strategic Fund of the Pan American Health
Organization (PAHO); WHO Regional Office of the Americas and the European Union (EU)
Joint Procurement of medical countermeasures (Box 1).
7.1 Joint procurement under subscription financing
The PAHO Strategic Fund and EU Joint Procurement initiatives use tenders to acquire medicines
or vaccines and achieve significant price reductions. Both agreements look to improve efficiency
in purchasing through leveraging economies of scale, larger population sizes and lower transac-
tion costs (WHO, 2007; Espin et al., 2016). The added benefit from purchasing using a subscrip-
tion model enables several improvements. Patients are encouraged to comply with treatment
regimens and no longer deterred from out-of-pocket user charges for accessing care. Payers bene-
fit from significant price reductions, and patients gain access to patented and expensive medicines
frequently unavailable in low-income countries. International collaboratives could minimise
administrative constraints on individual member states as resources, expertise and data can be
pooled across countries. Additionally, use of patent pooling can reduce the consequence of intel-
lectual property rights and increase access to patented medicines in LMICs (WHO, 2007; Smith
et al., 2009).
Notable barriers to joint procurement include absence of centralised purchasing authorities,
low government involvement in health care and weak infrastructure and stakeholder relations
to negotiate equitable financing agreements. International partnerships are often resource inten-
sive and require common objectives among member states.
8. High-income vs low-income countries
Many countries do not cover the full cost of pharmaceutical care within universal health coverage.
This necessitates co-payments, deductibles and out-of-pocket expenditures that can result in cata-
strophic and impoverishing outcomes for patients (Zhang et al., 2017; Nikoloski and Mossialos,
2018). Implementing a national purchasing strategy for medicines reduces the financial burden
on individuals. Conservative, partial or failed adherence with treatment due to financial con-
straints, including pill rationing and dose splitting, has consistently resulted in negative health
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Table 1. International joint procurement strategies for medicines
Agreement
Countries
(Region) Population Features
Subscription financing
(‘Netflix’) Netflix Plus
Monitoring and
Evaluation
PAHO Strategic Fund 33
(South
America)
500 m - 150 + products, USD
81.9 m in value
- 13 m in savings over
local procurement
- Support from regional
WHO centres
- Partnered with USAID
and the Global Fund
for forecasting and
information systems
- Open tenders to
promote generic
competition
- Predetermined costs
increase budget
predictability
- Unrestricted supply
reduces the need for
rationing and limit for
patient subgroups
- Reduces price,
administrative and
marketing expenses
- Can be used to reduce
user charges
- Applicable for a wide
range of medicines and
technology
- LMICs and small
countries benefit from
economies of scale in
purchasing
- Effective for procuring
on-patent first-in-class
and generic medicines
- Multiple subscriptions of
patented medicines
- Reduces price of multiple
therapeutic on-patent medicines
- Fee-for-service price scheme for
orphan drugs utilising
price-volume agreements and
tiered pricing
- Multiple countries benefit from
joint procurement of orphan
drugs through price discounts
from bulk purchases and
price-volume discounts
- Effective for procuring on-patent
medicines and orphan drugs
- Stimulates competition for
medicines in the patented
market similar to the off patent
market
- Iterative
multicomponent
strategy;
- Public (ministries of
health) and private
(manufacturers)
stakeholder interviews
- Analysis of tender
submissions
- Tracking patient
utilisation of medicines
EU Joint Procurement
of medical
countermeasures
24
(Europe)
447.8 m - Voluntary, minimum
four countries
- Advance purchasing
- Interest for pandemic
influenza and BCG
vaccines
Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC)
6
(Middle
East)
54 m - 9000 + products, USD
680 m in value
- Purchasing for some
public sector hospitals
in Saudi Arabia
- Encourages registered
generic producers
Organization of
Eastern Caribbean
States (OECS)
9
(Caribbean)
615,000 - 700 portfolio items,
70% are medicines
- 13% administrative fee
for member states
- Average savings of
37% over 5 years
H
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outcomes. These challenges occur in high- and low-income countries alike, as financing chal-
lenges extend beyond regional borders. Health care system payers, e.g. insurance funds, govern-
ments and regional purchasing organisations, stress the need for greater predictability in
financing to reduce budgetary shocks and provide greater certainty in resource allocation
(Chen et al., 2018; Izaret et al., 2019). Negotiating a prospective fixed cost allows payers and man-
ufacturers to achieve certainty in expenditure and revenue.
To increase transferability across countries and health systems, demographic, health system
financing and cultural norm adjustments may be required to facilitate global adoption.
Tailoring the model to local contexts and health systems will increase the likelihood of adoption
and reduce potential opposition. Adjustments may include the use of minimal co-payments and
limiting inclusion to defined patient groups to reduce payers’ financial burden.
9. Monitoring and evaluation
Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the Netflix model for financing medicines is not avail-
able as the earliest agreement, by the Australian government in 2015, is still under its original
term. Collecting data for financing, competition and utilisation is of interest to stakeholders.
Therefore, a series of recommendations for monitoring would help disseminate information
and provide a prospective plan for evaluation.
Iterative monitoring and evaluation of subscription financing must be assessed in a multicom-
ponent strategy including stakeholder interviews, analysis of tender submissions, and tracking
utilisation of medicines. Each component underscores a key design of the model and is thus
important to track progress against these objectives. Stakeholder interviews with public officials
(ministries of health) and pharmaceutical manufacturers will provide a qualitative analysis on
effectiveness, and an ad-hoc evaluation for challenges and opportunities. Second, analysing ten-
der bids submitted by manufacturers will provide context for competition and pricing
behaviour, specifically, the number of manufacturers which applied for the bid, how competitive
Box 1. Regional case studies on joint procurement
Pan American Health Organization
PAHOs Strategic Fund coordinates pooled procurement, supply management and acquisition of
strategic public health supplies and high-cost medicines (WHO, 2007; PAHO, 2015; Pan American Health
Organization, 2017). Current members include 17 ministries of health and partnerships with international
organisations such as the Global Fund and USAID. In 2015, negotiations led by the Strategic Fund with the
MERCOSUR Latin American countries purchased an antiretroviral for the treatment of HIV/AIDS. The
negotiation produced 20 million in savings, reducing the price more than 50% below the lowest available
price to any participating country (USD $2.98 to 1.27) (PAHO, 2015). In addition, negotiations with Gilead
Sciences for sofosbuvir, a direct-acting antiviral for the treatment of hepatitis C reduced prices to the
lowest price of the country in the region (USD $81.85 per tablet), a high cost despite pooled funding
(PAHO, 2015). The Strategic Fund has increased access to several essential medicines at a significantly
reduced cost with future negotiations including high-cost medicines for oncology.
European Union
The EU Joint Procurement of medical countermeasures was developed after the H1N1 influenza. This
led to competition for medical supplies which caused drastic price increases across Europe (Espin et al.,
2016). The joint procurement agreement was created to improve access to medicines, vaccines, antivirals
and other medical equipment necessary for resolving cross-border emergencies. The European
Commission is the Secretariat and responsible for coordination and logistics. Specific technical
committees are established for each joint procurement plan to assess price and resource allocation.
Successful procurement of the Botulinum anti-toxin in 2016 has led 19 member states to explore the
opportunity for the advance purchase of pandemic influenza vaccines (Philipp, 2017).
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the process was, and if the tender was fairly awarded to the most competitive bid. Lastly, the
incentive for patients is that they face no cost at the point of accessing care. Therefore, it is
important to monitor the uptake of medicine use at stages; within the first 3 months, 6 months,
1 year and each successive year to identify the distribution of utilisation and design mechanisms
for structuring future agreements.
10. Challenges
Benefits of subscription financing include increasing affordability and accessibility of necessary
medicines, improving treatment adherence and health, and reducing patient out-of-pocket
expenditure on pharmaceuticals – one of the highest attributors to impoverishment globally.
However, there are challenges.
New medicines benefit from market exclusivity and monopoly pricing. Awarding a single ten-
der for patented medicines may reduce innovation, R&D and result in further industry concen-
tration that will reduce competition and price discounts. Import of bioequivalent medicines from
external markets and short-term contracts for originators can incentivise future investment and
offer solutions to avoid monopolisation as proposed in the Netflix plus amendment. Off-patent
markets present different challenges (Mrazek and Mossialos, 2004; Mossialos and Oliver, 2005).
Distribution of generics in LMICs can be problematic for several reasons. Evidence indicates
bioequivalence is not a guarantee in all LMICs which can lead to quality, safety and efficacy con-
cerns (Nebot Giralt et al., 2017). Bioequivalence is of greatest concern in these countries because
of insufficient regulation for pharmaceuticals compared to high income countries. LMICs lack
regulatory and inspection mechanisms at the country or supranational level akin to the FDA
and EMA. WHO research estimates 10% of all medicines in LMICs are substandard or counter-
feit, particularly reported in Africa and the Americas (Newton et al., 2010; Mezher, 2017). This
has irreversibly damaged the reputation of generics in LMICs, with consumers often selecting to
pay out-of-pocket for branded alternatives in fear of medical harm. This effectively reduces com-
petition among producers and limits potential savings for payers and patients. Pricing agreements
will not solve this challenge. Governments must introduce strict regulations and penalties for
non-compliant generic producers and promote the use of bioequivalent generics where available.
A further limitation requires that payers be able to accurately predict the number of patients
likely to engage in treatment to determine a price point. This requires resources and infrastruc-
ture not available in most low-income countries. In addition, payment requires substantial capital
for licensing fees, likely generated from increased taxes, insurance premiums or diverting funds
from other public services and may engender political resistance. Finally, insufficient data – and
no data in low-income countries – means pharmaceutical corporations, which wield significant
global decision-making power and are generally risk averse, may avoid engagement in highest-
need high-risk settings. Despite potential for earning higher profits with subscription financing,
return on investment is capped, deterring participation and adversely impacting monopoly pro-
ducers. The complexity of national infrastructure coupled with big pharma risk aversion pose
challenges for competition and pricing and requires further context-specific evidence to accur-
ately inform practice.
11. Conclusion
Subscription financing has the potential to reform existing insurance contracts and reduce the
imbalance of power in the principal–agent relationship between payers and suppliers. The opioids
crisis in the United States has increased rates of hepatitis C, and thus the need for policy and
payment reform (Powell et al., 2019). The ‘Netflix model’ has received attention for its success
in combating hepatitis C and implications for additional chronic and communicable diseases.
Due to the confidentiality agreement on Australia’s 5-year trial of the subscription model,
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published evidence is lacking. Implementation in Louisiana and Washington DC may help
benchmarking in high-income contexts and encourage LMICs to pursue similar financing
arrangements with the interest of patients and cost containment.
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